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CASENOTES

ABDUCTION OF CHILD BY
NONCUSTODIAL PARENT:
DAMAGES FOR CUSTODIAL
PARENT'S MENTAL DISTRESS
Fenslage v. Dawkins'
Two parents divorce. The mother is awarded custody of the children,
but she agrees to let them visit their father. He is to return the children but
does not. Instead, he flees with them from the jurisidication of the court.
Child-snatching incidents are common, with estimates as high as
100,000 per year. 2 Also common is the mental distress suffered by the aggrieved, custodial parent, but tort actions to recover damages for this mental distress have been very rare. Such tort actions may increase, however,
following the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Fenslage v. Dawkins. The Fenslage court affirmed an award
totalling $130,000 in actual and punitive damages for the mental distress
inflicted on a custodial parent through child snatching.
In Fenslage, a mother and father were divorced in Texas, and custody
of their two children was awarded to the mother. She moved to Arizona
with the children, but agreed to let them visit their father in Texas during
the summer. He was then to return them to her in Arizona. Instead, he
fled with them to Canada. The jury in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas found that the father and some of his
relatives had conspired to take and conceal the children outside of Texas,
in knowing violation of the custody order, and that the relatives had given
false testimony in proceedings in state court and had provided the father
with financial and moral support. Following the jury's findings that these
acts were intentional and that the resulting mental anguish to the mother
was reasonably foreseeable, the district court entered a default judgment
against the father and held the defendants jointly and severally liable for
$65,000 in compensatory damages. In addition, the court awarded
1. 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980).
2. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child CustodyJurisdiction
Act and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive
Modifications, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 978, 979 (1977).
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punitive damages of $25,000 against the father, $15,000 against his
parents, $15,000 against his brother, and $10,000 against his sister, for a
total of $65,000 in punitive damages. The father's relatives appealed,s and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
4
district court's judgment.
In its decision that a custodial parent can recover damages for mental
distress from persons who wrongfully deprive that parent of the custody of
the child, the court of appeals quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
section 700: "One who, with knowledge that the parent does not consent,
abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor child to leave a parent
legally entitled to its custody or not to return to the parent after it has been
left him, is subject to liability to the parent." 5 That liability includes the
6
parent's mental distress.
Courts have applied section 700 infrequently, although it has been
part of the Restatement of Torts since 1938. 7 It was applied in 1940 by the
Michigan Supreme Court in Oversmith v. Lake, 8 when a jury awarded
$150 to a father whose six children were taken into custody, without
judicial intervention, by a welfare agent and a juvenile officer who thought
the children were neglected.9 The question of awarding damages for mental distress, however, was not reached.10 The Michigan Supreme Court did
reach that question in 1953 in Brown v. Brown." Again applying section
700, the court said that a parent wrongfully deprived of custody may
recover for emotional distress.' 2 The mother in Brown filed suit against six
of her in-laws, alleging, inter alia, a conspiracy to deprive her of the
custody of her two children; the children's father had abducted the

3. 629 F.2d at 1108-09.
4. Id. at 1111.
5. Id. at 1109 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977)).
6. "'The parent can recover for the loss of society of his child and for his
emotionaldistressresultingfrom its abductionor enticement."' 629 F.2d at 1109
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700, Comment g (1977)) (emphasis added by court). The parent also can recover any reasonable expenses incurred in regaining custody of the child or for treating medical conditions
resulting from the abduction. 629 F.2d at 1109.
7. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 700 (1938) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 700 (1977) and the comments that accompany both are similar.
8. 295 Mich. 627, 295 N.W. 339 (1940).
9. Id. at 629, 631, 295 N.W. at 340, 341.
10. "Defendants complain of the trial court's award of damages for plaintiff's 'great grief, worry, humiliation, and anxiety and pain of body and mind'
and for the 'element of nervous shock.' We decline to consider this question, as no
testimony is set forth in the record." Id. at 631-32, 295 N.W. at 341.
11. 338 Mich. 492, 61 N.W.2d 656 (1953).
12. Id. at 498, 61 N.W.2d at 659.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/4
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children to South Africa. The jury award of $150,000 for14conspiracy to
3
deprive her of the custody of her children was affirmed.
In 1963, the California Court of Appeals in Rosefield v. Rosefield' 5
found that a cause of action did lie against a grandfather for conspiracy
with the child's father to abduct and conceal the child. The complaint was
brought by the mother and the child through a guardian ad litem. 16 The
parents had separated before their daughter's birth, and the mother had
physical custody of the baby until the abduction." This child-abduction
case is unusual because no divorce proceedings had been filed; thus legal
custody of the child had been awarded neither to the mother nor denied to
the father. Nevertheless, the court, without precedent, called it legally
wrong for the father to abduct the child."' In this case, it was the defendant grandfather who cited comment c to section 700, which states that an
action for abduction cannot be brought against one parent if the parents
are jointly entitled to custody of the child.19 The court responded that this
passage does not deny that it is a legal wrong for a spouse to abduct the
child, but only that interspousal immunity would prevent a cause of action. Further, the court said that interspousal immunity was no longer the
rule in California and that even if it were, it would not protect a third
20
party, such as a grandfather.
13. Id. at 494-95, 61 N.W.2d at 657. No divorce had been granted at the
time of abduction, but after the abduction, an order nunc pro tunc gave the
mother exclusive custody of the children. Id. at 497, 61 N.W.2d at 658.
14. Id. at 504, 61 N.W.2d at 662.
15. 221 Cal. App. 2d 431, 34 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1963). Rosefield also is discussed at notes 62-65 and accompanying text infra.
16. For a discussion of a child's cause of action, see notes 62-66 and accompanying text infra.
17. 221 Cal. App. 2d at 432, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 480-81.
18. "The case seems to be without precedent, but this does not mean that
what is obviously an invasion of a mother's legal right is not a legal wrong." Id. a
435, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
19. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 700, Comment c (1938). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700, Comment c (1977) is virtually identical.
20. 221 Cal. App. 2d at 436, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 483. Interspousal immunity is
still recognized in Missouri. See, e.g., Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334, 336
(Mo. En Banc 1972); Wyatt v. Bernhoester, 585 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Mo. App.,
E.D. 1979); Huff v. LaSieur, 571 S.W.2d 654, 655 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978). This
immunity, however, applies only to torts committed during the marriage. Interspousal immunity would not preclude a tort action by a divorced custodial
parent against a child-snatching ex-spouse, nor would it preclude an action to
regain possession of a child when the parents are "living apart" and the custody
action is still pending: "[P]ending such adjudication the father or mother who actually has the custody and control of said unmarried minor children shall have
the sole right to the custody and control... of said unmarried minor children."
RSMO § 452.150 (1978). See also id. § 452.310.3.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
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In 1970, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found a cause of action for "harboring" against a grandmother in Hinton v. Hinton.21 The plaintiff parents, who went to Europe, left their son
with his grandmother. When the parents requested the child's return, he
did not return, although it is not clear why. The court did not consider the
grandmother's motives. Instead, it quoted section 700, on liability for inducing or preventing a child's return without a privilege to do so, 22 and
comment b, which flatly states that "motive or purpose . . . is
immaterial. '23 The court also rejected an old doctrine that it is necessary
for a parent to suffer a loss of the child's services for an action to lie. Instead, the court said, "We hold with the Restatement . . 'that the real
cause of action is the interference with the relation ... ,,24
The Oregon Supreme Court in 1978 in McBride v. Magnuson2s also
expressly rejected the service doctrine as a fiction that has been abandoned. The court cited comment e of section 700 in acknowledging that
interference with custodial rights is sometimes necessary for a child's protection. 26 The court rejected a claim of immunity, however, and held that
21. 436 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
22. Id. at 212.
23. Id. at 213 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 700, Comment b
(1938)). The quoted comment continues, "Thus the actor may be inspired by
motives of kindness and affection toward the child but none the less become liable
for interfering with the interests of its lawful custodian." 436 F,2d at 213. This
language is tempered, however, by comment a, which the court also quotes,
which states that a cause of action will not lie against one who "merely gives
shelter and sustenance to a child." Id. Comment e, which the court did not cite,
also extends a limited privilege to rescue a child from physical violence inflicted
by a parent. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 700, Comment e (1938). For a discussion
of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700, Comment e (1977), see note 26 in.

fra.
24. 436 F.2d at 213. For an example of a case requiring loss of services as a
prerequisite for damages for mental distress, see Magnuson v. O'Dea, 75 Wash.
574, 135 P. 640 (1913). For a history of thb loss of services doctrine, see Pickle v.
Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 476-82, 169 N.E. 650, 651-53 (1930).
The court in Hinton cited the Restatement positon that loss of services is unnecessary for a cause of action. 436 F.2d at 213. Comment d states, "[L]oss of service. . .is not a necessary element of a cause of action.... The deprivation to the
parent of the society of the child is itself an injury that the law redresses."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 700, Comment d (1938).
25. 282 Or. 433, 578 P.2d 1259 (1978).
26. 282 Or. at 435-36, 578 P.2d at 1260. Comment e provides a privilege to
rescue a child from parental physical violence. The immunity is limited, however,
by the requirement that it seem reasonably likely to the actor that the child would
suffer immediate harm and that the action be for the purpose of saving the child
from that harm. While a person with legal authorization is privileged to take a
child away from an "improper home," a private citizen does not have a privilege
"to abduct or entice a child from its parent to save the child from what the actor
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/4
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a cause of action brought by a parent against a27police officer for interference with the parent's right to custody did lie.
In Oversmith, Brown, Rosefield, Hinton, and McBride, the actions
for intefeference with custodial rights were maintained against a police officer, a welfare agent, in-laws, and grandparents. Comment a to section
700 provides that a custodial parent has a cause of action against one who
abducts a child or induces the child to leave the parent, knowing the
parent has not consented. 28 This is broad language, providing broad
coverage for parents. Anyone who interferes with their parental right to
custody, regardless of loss of service or intent, is a potential defendant
under section 700.
That Missouri would recognize this cause of action if the right circumstances were presented is the conclusion drawn from Kipper v.
Vokolek. 29 The father filed suit against the mother and stepfather for harboring or enticing from him his two daughters, who were taken to Honduras.3 0 The Springfield Court of Appeals concluded that the mother had
legal custody of the children and thus rejected the father's claim of a cause
of action.3 1 But the court said:
The tort [of interference with custodial rights] may be actionable
between parents of the child where, by proper judicial decree, the
sole custody of the child has been awarded to one of the parents. In
such instances, the parent not awarded custody may be liable to
the other for the abduction of his own child, or may be liable to the
other if, with knowledge that the child has left the home of the
parent having custody against the latter's will, induces the child
not to return thereto or prevents it from so doing. Restatement,
Torts § 700.32
Besides allowing recovery by the custodial parent against the noncustodial
recovery against conparent, it appears that the court also would allow
33
spirators who interfered with custodial rights.
reasonably believes to constitute improper surroundings or immoral influences,
nor to afford it advantages superior to those available in its home." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700, Comment e (1977).

27.

282 Or. at 438, 578 P.2d at 1261.

28. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 700, Comment a (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700, Comment a (1977).

29. 546 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. App., Spr. 1977).
30. Id. at 523, 525.
31. Id. at 526-27.
32. Id. at 525.
33. The court cited Rosefield v. Rosefield, 221 Cal. App. 2d 431, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 479 (1963), for the proposition that "[i]f one parent is guilty of the tort in
question, a third person who aids, abets or conspires with the parent tortfeasor
may also be liable to the parent who has been wronged." 546 S.W.2d at 525-26.
For a discussion of Rosefield, see notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
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Section 700 allows recovery for mental distress and other forms of
liability in the limited circumstances when one interferes with the
custodial rights of a parent. In its narrow range of application, section 700
does allow for broad coverage since "liability" can include, among other
things, loss of the child's services, the costs of locating the child, and the
child's medical expenses resulting from the abduction, as well as the mental distress of the parent or other lawful custodian.
But even without section 700, the Restatement of Torts still contains
the essential machinery for a cause of action for mental distress. Section 46
provides for recovery for mental distress resulting from outrageous conduct: "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability
for such emotional distress . . . . 4 A much broader range of circumstances than child abductions, of course, is covered by section 46,
although liability is limited to damages for mental distress. As a practical
matter, however, costs incurred as a result of child abduction possibly can
be recovered in an action incorporating mental distress brought by an aggrieved parent or other lawful custodian under section 46.s On the other
hand, in the case of an abduction lasting for only a few moments, a
custodial parent who was not even aware of the abduction at the time conceivably might be allowed a cause of action under section 700 for nominal
damages arising from the abduction, whereas no recovery would be allowed under section 46 without severe mental distress resulting from
outrageous conduct. In most child-abduction cases, however, either section 700 or section 46 could be pleaded separately or alternatively by the
parent in an action for mental distress resulting from child abduction.
The section 46 cause of action for damages for mental distress stemming from outrageous conduct has been recognized since about 1930.16
Thus it is not new, but what is new is the broad range of situations to which
s1The fluidity of
courts are increasingly applying it.
the standards for what
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). Section 46 and the
comments of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provide a significantly changed
and expanded version of RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934) and comments.
35. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text infra.
36. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 56 (4th ed.
1971).
37. Morrison, Outrage and Emotional Distress: New Directions In Tort
Law, 34 J. Mo. B. 269, 272-73 (1978). Accord, Lambert, Tort Liability for
Psychic Injuries: Overview and Update, 37 A.T.L.A. L.J. 1, 2 (1978). For cases
and articles on-the tort of outrageous conduct, see id. at 2-4; Morrison, supra, at
269 passim. No physical harm is required for recovery. W. PROSSER, supra note
36, at 60; Lambert, supra, at 2-4. Comment k says that § 46 is "not... limited to
cases where there has been bodily harm; and if the conduct is sufficiently extreme
and outrageous there may be liability for the emotional distress alone, without
such harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment k (1965). But
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/4
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conduct is sufficiently outrageous to incur liability leaves the tort of mental
distress open for expansion by the innovative. 8 Severe mental distress, of
course, must be proved, but comment j lightens the burden of proof.3 9 It
states that the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's actions is often significant evidence that the distress occurred. 40 Thus, in the
case of child snatching, the child's wrongful abduction from the custodial
parent could be significant evidence that the parent has suffered severe
Missouri has required bodily harm for a cause of action to be stated under § 46.
See, e.g., Leonard v. Pioneer Fin. Co., 568 S.W.2d 937, 940 (Mo. App., K.C.
1978). The context, however, was not child abduction, which comes replete with
its own built-in limitations. See note 41 and accompanying text infra. Section 46
also dispenses with an intent requirement. Chopin, Emotional DistressCaused By
Outrageous Conduct: A New Tort in Florida, 54 FLA. B.J. 262, 264 (1980).
Reckless conduct is enough to warrant liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 46, Comment i (1965). Prosser says that in cases allowing recovery,
however, there usually is intent either in the sense that the defendant wanted to
cause the result or knew the result was substantially certain to follow. But Prosser
recognizes that "extreme outrage is broader than intent," thus encompassing
recklessness. W. PROSSER, supra, at 60. Reckless conduct occurs when a defendant knows there is a high degree of probability, as opposed to substantial certainty, that his action will cause mental distress, but nonetheless acts in conscious
disregard of this probability. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Com-

ment i (1965). At least one commentator maintains that negligence is enough for
liability. See Theis, The IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress:A Need for
Limits on Liability, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 275, 290 (1978).

The court ascertains the level of outrageousness that clearly justifies or clearly
does not justify recovery, and the jury decides cases on which reasonable people
could differ. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment h (1965).
38. "The law is still in a stage of development, and the ultimate limits of this
tort are not yet determined." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment
c (1965). This amorphousness concerns those who prefer well-defined limits. See,
e.g., Theis, supra note 37. Comment d does provide some limits, as it says that
liability has been imposed only when the conduct is "so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to
be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." In
other words, liability is not imposed for petty annoyances. The Restatement
depends on the reaction of the average citizen to distinguish the outrageous from
the petty. The situation is outrageous, says the Restatement, if on hearing the
facts recited the citizen would be so aroused with resentment that he would exclaim, "Outrageousl" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment d
(1965). Theis criticizes comment d as presenting a circular definition of
"outrageous." See Theis, supra, at 288-89. The policy of section 46 is perhaps
summed up in comment j, which states, "The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965). See Morrison, supra

note 37, at 271.
39. See Chopin, supra note 37, at 264.
40.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
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mental distress. Built-in limitations on recovery for mental distress exist in
the case of child snatching, however, because of the limited number of
persons who are potential plaintiffs. Only the custodial parent or other
lawful custodian may maintain this cause of action; furthermore, the action brought by the lawful custodian is not merely for mental distress, but is
also for the rupture of the relationship with the child. 4 '
New York has been a leader in allowing parents or other persons with
legal custody to recover for mental distress. In 1930 in Pickle v. Page,42
grandparents, who had legal custody of their grandson after their
daughter had abandoned him, recovered against a sheriff who, at the
daughter's behest, abducted the child. 43 The New York Court of Appeals
quoted an old South Carolina opinion in reaching its decision: "The true
ground of action is the outrage and deprivation; the injury the father sustains in the loss of his child; the insult offered to his feelings; the heartrending agony he must suffer in the destruction of his dearest hope ....

,,44

Damages for "wounded feelings" and punitive damages could be
45
awarded.
41. Because of these limitations, parental causes of action are "not subject
to the objection of innumberable actions based upon mental distress." 1 F.
HARPER &F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 8.6, at 627 (1956).
42.
43.

252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650 (1930).
Id. at 475-76, 169 N.E. at 650-51.

44. Id. at 480, 169 N.E. at 652 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Lockhart, 3 S.C.L.
(1 Brev.) 654 (1807)). The court rejected loss of service as necessary for recovery,
holding that "a direct recovery may be had without resort to the fiction that a loss
of service has been occasioned." 252 N.Y. at 482, 169 N.E. at 653.
45. 252 N.Y. at 483, 169 N.E. at 653. In Lisker v. City of New York, 72
Misc. 2d 85, 338 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1972), a mother sued the City of New York. Her
husband had taken their infant and had given him to the New York Bureau of
Child Welfare, which had instructed its home to place the infant under foster
care without the mother's consent or an order from the family court. She sought
$25,000 for the resulting mental distress. Id. at 85-86, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 360-61.
The Supreme Court of Queens County said that allowing her to sue for mental
distress would not "open the floodgates of litigation" and held that the facts of this
case fell within the "spirit of the rules" enunciated in Pickle. Id. at 88-89, 338
N.Y.S. at 363-64.
New York courts have not reacted favorably, however, to parents seeking
damages for violations of visitation rights. In McGrady v. Rosenbauni, 62 Misc.
2d 182, 308 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1970), affd mem., 37 A.D.2d 917, 324 N.Y.S.2d 876
(1971), a father sued his ex-wife and her parents because her parents induced and
aided her to leave with his son and establish residence in Israel. He asked for, in
part, $1,000,000 for mental anguish and $5,000 to compensate him for the
money he spent looking for his son. 62 Misc. 2d at 183-84, 308 N.Y.S.2d at
183-84. The Supreme Court of New York County said it was a case of "novel impression," but that a parent wrongfully deprived of his child may recover
damages for mental anguish. Id. at 186-87, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 186. But in this case,
the mother had lawful custody, although the father had weekly visitation rights.
Id. at 183, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 183. The court concluded that there could be no
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/4
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In 1978 in Kajtazi v. Kajtazi,46 damages were awarded for mental
distress caused by the outrageous conduct of child abduction. The
mother, who was seeking a divorce in California, was awarded custody of
her son while the divorce action was pending. Her husband, Fabian, abducted their child, who needed surgery for a neurological condition, and
fled first to his parents' home in New York and then to Yugoslavia. The
mother sought a writ of habeas corpus in the New York Supreme Court of
Queens County against Fabian, his brother, and his stepfather. In an initial appearance by Fabian's brother and stepfather, they stated that they
did not know where Fabian and the child were; the brother, under oath in
a subsequent appearance, admitted he lied. A proceeding for civil and
criminal contempt followed, during which the brother announced that
Fabian and the child would never return to the United States. The mother
then filed an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York to recover damages for the false imprisonment of her
son and for mental suffering.4 7 Applying New York law, the court said:
It is difficult to conceive of intentional conduct more
calculated to cause severe emotional distress than the outrageous
conduct of the defendant Fabian in surreptitiously abducting the
infant, from his mother who had legal custody, and falsely imprisoning him in Yugoslavia. This outrageous conduct constitutes
the distinct tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering under
48
New York decisional law.
damages for violated visitation rights. Id. at 188, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 187-88. Nor
was the reaction favorable when a parent brought an action only against the other
parent. In Friedman v. Friedman, 79 Misc. 2d 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1974), the
Supreme Court of Queens County dismissed an action brought by a parent for
damages for mental distress resulting from violated custody provisions and visitation rights. The court pointed out that Pickle and Lisker involved both parents
and third parties. Id. at 647, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 1i0. The court said, "'The remedy
against a spouse who violates a court order respecting custody or visitation by
removing the child from the State is by way of contempt or by precluding her
standing to challenge the order or to enforce its support provisions, not by an action for damages."' Id. at 647, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 109 (quoting McGrady).
In Vermont, however, a cause of action for intentional infliction of severe
mental distress under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) was
recognized for a mother deprived of any contact or communication with her
daughter. Sheltra v. Smith, 136 Vt. 472, 475, 392 A.2d 431, 432 (1978). In Illinois, a father was awarded $150,000 under § 46 for the severe mental distress he
suffered when intentionally denied visitation rights. Johannes v. Sloan, No.
79-L-169 (Kankakee Cty. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 1981).
For the position of RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 700 (1938) and RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1965) on actions between parents, see note 19 and accompanying text supra.
46. 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
47. Id. at 17-18.
48. Id. at 20.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
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The mother was awarded total damages of over $181,000 for herself and
her son from the father, his brother, and his stepfather. Of this award,
49
$14,950 ($50 a day) was for her mental suffering.
Section 46 of the Restatement, like section 700, rarely has been
employed. But both sections of the Restatement are available to the aggrieved custodial parent in child-snatching cases to recover damages for
mental distress. This remedy has been available in child-snatching cases
for more than fifty years, but now with the $130,000 award for actual and
punitive damages for the custodial parent's mental distress in Fenslage v.
Dawkins,5 0 perhaps this remedy has come of age.
At a time when tort actions for mental distress are raising the ante in
child-snatching cases, the federal government also is entering the childsnatching area. Congress has enacted the Parental Kidnaping Prevention
Act of 1980.51 One of the express purposes of the Act is to deter parental
child abduction. 52 Among the features of the Act are: (1) the giving of full
faith and credit between state jurisdictions to child custody determinations,53 and (2) use of the "Parent Locator Service" to enforce child
custody determinations." The effect of the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act on recovery for mental distress is serendipitous. The Act was not
passed to enable the custodial parent to collect damages for mental
distress, but the Parent Locator Service, which locates fugitive parents, increases the threat of a large damage suit for mental distress.
49. Id. at 20-21. The court awarded the son $10,980 actual damages for
false imprisonment and $50,000 punitive damages. The mother was awarded
$14,950 for loss of services and wounded feelings, $500 for personal expenses,
$5,000 for legal expenses incurred while trying to regain her son, and $100,000 in
punitive damages for the abduction. Id. at 21-22.
50. For a discussion of the facts in Fenslage,see notes 3-6 and accompanying
text supra.

51. Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3568-73 (1980). This is the federal
version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.C.C.J.A.). In Missouri
the U.C.C.J.A., RSMO §§ 452.440-.550 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1980), was adopted
in 1977. See Krauskopf, Child CustodyJurisdictionunder the U.C. C.J.A., 34J.

Mo. B. 383, 385 (1978). Forty-six states have adopted the U.C.C.J.A., most
within the last few years. S. KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO
THE ABDUCTION OF CHILDREN 15 (1981). This book provides an extended discus-

sion of the U.C.C.J.A.
52. Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(c)(6), 94 Stat. 3568 (1980).
53. Id. at § 8, 94 Stat. 3569-71.
54. Id. at § 9, 94 Stat. 3571-73. The Act also makes clear the congressional
intent that 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976), which makes interstate or international flight
in order to avoid prosecution a federal offense, applies to parental kidnaping
where state law makes it a felony. Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 10, 94 Stat. 3573 (1980).
For a brief evaluation of the Act, see Shutter, ParentalKidnaping Prevention
Act-Panacea or Toothless Tiger? 55 FLA. B.J. 479 (1981).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/4
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Other possibilities for combating child snatching are available. As
Kajtazz55 demonstrates, an action for false imprisonment of the child is one
possibility. An action for the mental distress of the custodial parent can
combine with other tort actions, such as false imprisonment, to enhance
damages. An ever-present danger for child-snatching parents is contempt
proceedings for violating court custody orders. In response to the increasing problem of child snatching, many jurisdictions have passed or stiffened
laws making parental child snatching a crime; 56 Missouri law makes in57
terference with custody a crime.
Unusual circumstances in child-abduction cases may lend themselves
to unusual possibilities for causes of action available to the innovative advocate. For example, in McEvoy v. Helikson,58 the Oregon Supreme Court
allowed an action for malpractice and negligence against an attorney
brought by a client's ex-husband. The plaintiff father was awarded
custody of his child by a divorce decree, but the mother, a citizen of
Switzerland, was in possession of the child because of a subsequent court
order giving her temporary custody. Under court order, the defendant attorney held the mother's passport in escrow and agreed not to return it
until she returned the child. He gave the passport to the mother without
her returning the child, and she fled to Switzerland, child in tow.5 9 The
court concluded that a factfinder could find that the mother's conduct was
reasonably foreseeable. Citing Pickle v. Page,60 the court said that the infringement of the father's legal right to custody was the subject of the action, and that, if he established his allegations, he would be entitled to
61
recover for mental distress.
55.

For a discussion of Kajtazi, see notes 46-49 and accompanying text

supra.

56.

Some states have felony provisions for parental child abduction. See,

e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 278.5, 280 (West Cum. Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 10-5 (Smith-Hurd 1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.50 (McKinney 1975);
VA. CODE § 18.2-47 (Cum. Supp. 1981). For a table of the criminal statutes in the
fifty states and their text, see S. KATZ, supra note 51, at 155-94. In 1978, legislation did pass the United States Senate that would have made child snatching a
federal offense. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1624 (1978). See also Evaschuk,
Abduction of Children by Parents, 21 CRIM. L.Q. 176, 191-93 (1978). The
Parental Kidnaping Act of 1980, however, does not contain such a provision. For
a discussion of the Act, see notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra.
57. RSMO § 565.150 (1978). The purpose of § 565.150.2, which makes

removing an abducted child from Missouri a felony, presumably was to permit
extradition. See Krauskopf, supra note 51, at 392 nn.6-7. For the effect of state
felony statutes under the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, see note 54
supra.
58. 277 Or. 781, 562 P.2d 540 (1977).

59. Id. at 783-85, 562 P.2d at 541-42.
60.

For a discussion of Pickle, see notes 42-45 and accompanying text supra.

61.

277 Or. at 789, 562 P.2d at 544.
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In Rosefield v. Rosefield, 2 the California Court of Appeals held that a
child, represented by her guardian ad litem, did have a cause of action
against her grandfather who, along with her father, abducted her from
her mother. 63 The plaintiff child was "entitled to the society and care, and
protection and affection of her mother," the court said.64 The child's cause
65
of action was for deprivation of motherly care.
An action such as that maintained by the child in Rosefield would
perhaps fall into the category of a more amorphous tort sometimes called a
"prima facie" tort. Section 870 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
states, "One who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not
justifiable under the circumstances. This liability may be imposed
although the actor's conduct does not come within a traditional category
of tort liability."6 6 In states where interspousal immunity is not a bar, 67 this
cause of action could be used by a parent, such as the mother in Rosefield,
62. 221 Cal. App. 2d 431, 34 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1963). For more onRosefield,
see notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra.
63. The court said that for a "willful and malicious tort," a child does have a
cause of action, even against a parent. If there is no parental immunity, then a
fortiorithere is no immunity for a third party. 221 Cal. App. 2d at 437, 34 Cal.
Rptr. at 484.
64. Id. at 436, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
65. Id. at 437, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 484. In a related matter concerned with
children's rights, in Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978), the
Supreme Court of Oregon held that a minor child cannot sue a parent who abandons the child for the mental distress that results. See Minor ChildHas No Cause
of Action Against Parentfor Emotional Harm Caused by Abandonment, 58
WASH. U. L.Q. 189 (1980); IntentionalActs and Omissions of a ParentAmounting to CriminalAbandonment and Nonsupport of a Minor Child Do Not Give
Rise to a Cause ofAction in Tort on Behalf ofa ChildAgainst his Parentfor Purely PsychologicalInjuries, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 940 (1979). In Strode v. Gleason, 9
Wash. App. 13, 510 P.2d 250 (1973), the Washington Court of Appeals held that
a parent does have a cause of action against third parties who maliciously alienate
a minor child's affections, and in dictum, the court also stated that a minor may
sue a third person who wrongfully induces a parent to desert the child. Id. at
19-20, 510 P.2d at 254. Thus, some courts will not allow a child to sue a parent for
the mental distress suffered from abandonment, while other courts allow the
child to sue a third person who induces the parental abandonment.
Missouri rejects alienation of affection suits by children against third parties.
In Hale v. Buckner, 615 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981), the court held that a
four-year-old boy failed to state a cause of action against a third party who
allegedly alienated the affections of his father. The court said that rejection is the
majority rule and cited 13 decisions in accord and 4 contrary decisions from other
states. Id. at 97-98.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1977).
67. For a brief discussion of interspousal immunity in Missouri, see note 20
supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/4
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who wanted to maintain an action against a child-snatching spouse even
though no divorce proceedings had commenced. Also, if joint custody had
one parent abducted a child, an acbeen awarded to divorced spouses and
68
tion for prima facie tort could lie.

68.

States differ widely in their attitudes on joint custody. In California,

joint custody is now preferred: "There shall be a presumption .

.

. that joint

custody is in the best interest of a minor child where the parents have agreed to an
If the court fails to award joint custody, it must state
award of joint custody ....
its reasons. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1981). In Michigan,
joint custody is acceptable. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 100 Mich. App. 75, 83-84, 298
N.W.2d 667, 670 (1980). In Florida, the law is "well settled" that "split custody
provisions . . . are strongly disfavored and ordinarily may not be sustained."

Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 380 So. 2d 1164, 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). In
Missouri, joint custody awards have been held void. Cradic v. Cradic, 544 S.W.2d
605, 607 (Mo. App., Spr. 1976). Further, without an award of custody to one
parent or the other, divorce decrees in Missouri have been held not to be a final
judgment and hence unappealable. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Allen, 570
S.W.2d 352, 353 (Mo. App., Spr. 1978). See generally Freed & Foster, Divorce in
the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q. 229, 233-37 (1981).
The phrase "joint custody," however, may be used in at least two different
senses, and a jurisdiction may accept one sense of the phrase while rejecting
another. Joint "legal" custody does not necessarily mean joint "physical" custody.
In California, joint custody is defined as "an order awarding custody of the minor
... children to both parents and providing that physical custody shall be shared
by the parents in such a way as to assure the... children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents." But the law adds that the court "may award joint
legal custody without awarding joint physical custody." CAL. CIV. CODE §
4600.5(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1981). In Michigan in Wilcox, an award of joint
legal custody was upheld, while an award of "alternate or joint physical custody,"
which provided that parents would exchange minor children every Friday, was
overturned. 100 Mich. App. at 86, 298 N.W.2d at 671.
Even with an award of joint custody, a parent may be found guilty of violating
laws against child abduction. In People v. Harrison, 82 Ill. App. 3d 530, 402
N.E.2d 822 (1980), a father who abducted his children to Mississippi was found
guilty of child abduction under ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 10-5 (Smith-Hurd
1979). He had been awarded joint custody of his children, with physical custody
of the children granted to the mother and reasonable visitation rights granted to
him. The Illinois Court of Appeals said that joint custody gives "equal powers,
rights, and duties" to parents and that "neither party could remove the children
without infringing on the powers, rights, and duties of the other." 82 Ill. App. 3d
at 530-31, 402 N.E.2d at 823-24.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700, Comment c (1977) states, "When
the parents are by law jointly entitled to the custody and earnings of the child, no
action can be brought against one of the parents who abducts or induces the child
to leave the other." It makes no distinction between legal and physical custody.
But section 870 could be used when joint custody was awarded if the abducting
parent's injurious action was "generally culpable and not justifiable."
For varying perspectives on the desirability of joint custody, see GougeJoint
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
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Missouri has recognized prima facie tort as a cause of action in Porter
v. Crawford & Co. 69 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District concluded in Porter that Missouri should adopt the prima facie
tort doctrine, observing that the doctrine is consistent with the Missouri
Constitution, article I, section 14, which provides for a "'certain remedy
for every injury to person, property or character."' 10 Citing section 870
repeatedly, the court said that "Missouri has not been reluctant to adopt
new forms of action in tort based on Restatement principles."7 1 The court
rejected the view that adopting this tort would precipitate a flood of litigation.7 2 It set forth these elements, gleaned from case law as well as the
Restatement, for liability under prima facie tort theory: "(1) Intentional
lawful act by the defendant. (2) An intent to cause injury to the plaintiff.
(3) Injury to the plaintiff. (4) An absence of any justification or an insufficient justification for the defendant's act. '7 s The requirements of this tort
could be met by a child in Missouri abducted from one parent by the other
when no divorce proceedings between the parents have commenced. The
abduction would be a lawful act in that both parents would be entitled to
custody of the child. As prima facie tort is an intentional tort, parental immunity may not apply in Missouri; the law on parental immunity is not
clear. 74 Interspousal immunity, however, would prevent a parent from
bringing a prima facie tort action against an abducting spouse in
Missouri.

75

Custody: A Revolution in Child Custody Law?, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 326 (1981);
Koenig,Joint Custody: A Viable Alternative, 60 MICH. B.J. 170 (1981); Levy &
Chambers, The Folly ofJoint Custody, 3 FAM. ADVOCATE 6 (1981); Trombetta,
Joint Custody: Recent Research and Overloaded CourtroomsInspire New Solutions to Custody Disputes, 19J. FAM. L. 213 (1981).
69. 611 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
70. Id. at 269, 272 (quoting MO. CONST. art. I, § 14).
71. Id. at 272.
72.
The concern implicit or expressed, that the creation of a new theory of
tort liability pursuant to the guideline of Section 870 Restatement (Sec-

ond) of Torts, will result in a flood of litigation, is unfounded. The
burden of proof upon the plaintiff to show an intent to injure, not merely
an intentional act, as well as the preservation of the right of the defendant to plead and prove a justification for the act, make it unlikely that
the theory will be subject to abuse.
Id.

73.
'74.

Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
For a discussion of Missouri's confused law on parental immunity, see

Kohler v.Rockwell Int'l Corp., 600 S.W.2d 647, 648-49 (Mo.App., W.D.1980).
75. For a brief discussion of interspousal immunity inMissouri, see note 20
supra.
When parents are living apart and a divorce action ispending,a prima facie
tort action would not be available as the parent inpossession of the child would
have a legal right to the child; abduction of the child, therefore, would be an
unlawful act. See id.; note 57 and accompanying text supra. A prima facie tort
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/4
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For a custodial parent or other person with a legal right to a child's
custody, an action for mental distress can be an effective means for seeking
damages from a child-snatching parent or conspirator. Mental distress as a
cause of action can work in tandem with other proceedings and causes of
action-contempt proceedings, criminal proceedings where available,
false imprisonment actions on behalf of the child, perhaps prima facie tort
actions by the child against the abducting parent, and possibly more exotic
causes of action made available by unusual circumstances. Of course,
when the abducting parent cannot be located and when there are no conspirators to be reached, an injured parent will simply suffer a wrong
without a remedy. Even when damages can be collected from conspirators,
the plaintiff parent may get the money but not the child if the abducting
parent and abducted child cannot be located. Perhaps with the passage of
the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980,76 instances of unlocated
parents and children will decrease.7 Problems for recovery of both
damages and children will remain most serious when the parent leaves the
country with the child.7 8 But for a child-snatching parent who can be
located, an action for damages for the mental distress inflicted on the
custodial parent should be sobering. Most imporant, the threat of large
damage awards, both punitive as well as actual, combined with the increased threat of discovery provided by the Parent Locator Service in the
Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, should deter future child
snatchers. 79 In turn, this deterrence can promote peace of mind for the
custodial parents and for the children.
SANDRA DAVIDSON SCOTT
action requires as an element that the act be lawful. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
76. For a discussion of the 1980 Act, see notes 51-54 and accompanying text
supra.
77. For information on private organizations dedicated to helping parents
locate their abducted children, see Davidson, When ParentsKidnap Their Own
Children, U. S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 30, 1981, at 67.
78. On international conferences to help solve problems caused by international child abductions, see Comment, Law and Treaty Responses to International Child Abductions, 20 VA.J. INT'L L. 669, 688-97 (1980).
For the problems of aliens seeking custody of children in the United States,
see, e.g., Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978) (Vietnamese
grandmother and uncle seeking custody of "Operation Babylift" children in foster
home); Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961)
(Lebanese father seeking custody of daughter).
79. "Although the remedy of a tort action has been sparingly used in child
custody cases where one party wrongfully takes a child ....

it may become an ef-

fective sanction under favorable circumstances. The chance that punitive
damages may be obtained should have a deterrent effect upon people of means."
Foster, Tortious Interference with Parent-ChildRelation, 13 TRIAL LAW. Q.,
Spr. 1979, at 93.
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